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We generally learn best by practice and experience. This is just as true
for legal education as it is for the education of other professionals, but in
most American law schools, students may graduate having very little
practice or experience in many of the skills that lawyers must possess to
represent clients competently and ethically. Although they spend hundreds
of classroom hours learning legal analysis in various doctrinal contexts, law
students have only limited opportunities to learn other lawyering skills that
are essential for practice. Their clients suffer the consequences. Among
these critical lawyering skills are some that are learned chiefly by practice
and experience rather than by theory alone: communication skills, client
interviewing and fact investigation skills, client counseling skills, problem
solving skills, and ethical judgment.
Most law schools provide limited opportunities for experiential learning
in live-client legal clinics and externships, but law clinics are relatively
expensive learning vehicles, so they typically accommodate only a fraction
of the enrolled students. Despite the urgent need for additional experiential
learning opportunities for law students, partnerships between law schools
and practicing lawyers to provide hands-on training in essential lawyering
skills have run into an unlikely obstacle: the attorney-client privilege rules.
The very rules that are designed to protect the proper working of the
attorney-client relationship may prevent law students from preparing
themselves adequately to work with their future clients.
The attorney-client privilege rules protect interests that are at the core of
an attorney's representation of a client in the adversarial system. The
evidentiary privilege reinforces the attorney's own professional duty of
confidentiality, which encourages client disclosure and trust. The resulting
client confidences and candor are necessary to inform the attorney's
judgment and decisions about how best to represent the client's interests.'
However, because the privilege limits the discovery of potentially relevant
information, the privilege is construed narrowly, and certain acts or
circumstances may waive the privilege.2
Relevant to law students and legal education is the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege that can occur when communications between the
attorney and client take place in the presence of a third party who is not an
1. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 408 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Floyd v. Floyd, 615 S.E.2d 465, 483-84 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); Kobluk v. Univ. of
Minn., 574 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Minn. 1998); Ullman v. State, 647 A.2d 324, 330-31 (Conn. 1994); In
re Jacqueline F., 391, 972 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1979); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973).
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attorney. Although some exceptions to the waiver rules exist, these
exceptions do not protect all confidential communications between clients
and their attorneys in situations when law student apprentices legitimately
may be present.4 Lawyers and legal educators have recognized the value of
experiential learning and advise that law students should observe and
participate first-hand in the work of attorneys.5 However, attorneys willing
to mentor law students cannot risk compromising their clients' right to
confidentiality, and they may exclude law students from the lawyering
experiences that could be most instructive: direct contact with real clients.
Although there are compelling reasons-critical to the professional and
ethical development of future lawyers-for distinguishing law students from
other third parties with regard to the attorney-client privilege, the law largely
ignores that distinction. One early court held that confidential legal
communications with a law student were no more privileged than similar
communications with a blacksmith.6
This article argues that the law of attorney-client privilege should treat
law students differently from other third parties.7 The gap in the law that
excludes law students from the attorney-client privilege represents a failure
to support the direction and needs of modern legal education and impedes
practical attempts by law schools to enhance the competence and ethical
3. See, e.g., Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 196-97 (Colo. 2001); State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d
543, 548 (Iowa 1996); Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614, 617-18 (Mass. 2001); State v.
Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Minn. 2001); Doe v. Poe, 700 N.E.2d 309, 310 (N.Y. 1998).
4. As used in this article, the term "law student apprentices" includes law clinic students, law
student externs, law students participating in unpaid attorney mentor programs, volunteer law clerks,
and law students involved in other legal education experiences supervised by a volunteer attorney.
5. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 234-35 (1992) (the "MACCRATE
REPORT" named for Robert MacCrate, Esq., chair of the taskforce) [hereinafter MACCRATE
REPORT]; ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE (1996) [hereinafter
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]; see generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite
Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV.
705 (1998) [hereinafter SCHILTZ - LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE].
6. Dierstein v. Schubkagel, 18 A. 1059, 1060 (Pa. 1890) ("A law student is, in this respect, on
no higher plane than a blacksmith retained in a like service."); accord People v. Doe, 416 N.Y.S.2d
466, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
7. The focus of this article is chiefly on the waiver of the privilege that can occur because of a
law student's presence as a third party during confidential communications. It does not argue that all
law students should be considered independent "legal advisers" in their own right deserving of the
privilege regardless of the presence or supervision of a licensed attorney.
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development of future members of a profession that is criticized frequently
on grounds of competence and ethics. 8
II. PREPARATION FOR LAW PRACTICE: THE NECESSARY
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND ETHICS
There is general consensus about the core competencies of effective
lawyers, even though opinions about the ideal preparation for law practice
and the proper curricular emphases of law schools have varied and evolved
over time. 9  Legal analysis and reasoning tops most lists of essential
lawyering skills, but there are other skills that are also considered
indispensable: oral and written communication, client interviewing and fact
investigation, client counseling, problem solving skills, and ethical
judgment.' These client-centered skills, which are learned chiefly by
experience, are important because both the lawyer-client relationship and the
lawyer's ability to work effectively on behalf of the client depend on them."l
In 1992, the American Bar Association's Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession, chaired by Robert MacCrate, issued its seminal report on
legal education and professional development. 12 In the course of evaluating
the state of American legal education, the MacCrate Report provided an
extensive analysis of the fundamental skills and values necessary for
effective law practice. 3 In the years since its appearance, the MacCrate
report and its recommendations have been in turn both hailed and
criticized,' 4 but there has been no serious disagreement with its description
of the professional skills and values essential for law practice.
8. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1345 n. 23 (1997); Patrick
J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 907 (1999) [hereinafter SCHILTZ - ON BEING AN
ETHICAL LAWYER]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2000).
9. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S TO
THE 1980'S (1983); see discussion infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., John Sonsteng & David Carnarotto, Minnesota Lawyers Evaluate Law Schools,
Training and Job Satisfaction, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 327, 335 (2000) [hereinafter SONSTENG &
CAMAROTTO]; Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 473 (1993) [hereinafter GARTH & MARTIN]; MACCRATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 135, 138-40.
11. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing its Impact and
Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 109 (2001); Brook K. Baker,
Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning,
36 ARIZ. L. REv. 287, 288-90, 353 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by
Narrowing the Field. What's Missing From the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and
Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1994).
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All fundamental lawyering skills relate to four basic values of the legal
profession: (1) providing competent representation, (2) striving to promote
justice, fairness, and morality, (3) honoring the profession's duty to enhance
the capacity of law and legal institutions to do justice, and (4) continuing to
develop professionally. 5 Thus, "fundamental" skills are those necessary for
basic professional competence and those necessary to fulfill a lawyer's
ethical duty to promote justice.
A. Necessary Lawyering Skills
The MacCrate Report identified ten key practice skills that every
attorney needs: problem-solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal
research, fact investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation,
litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures, organization and
management of legal work, and the ability to recognize and resolve ethical
dilemmas.' 6 Among these key lawyering skills are some that are learned
well only in a practice setting: communication skills, client interviewing and
fact investigation skills, counseling skills, and problem solving skills.
First, effective communication skills are consistently rated by lawyers as
essential to the lawyer-client relationship and to a lawyer's ability to practice
law.' 7 Communication skills are required in interactions with the client and
in the lawyer's contact with other parties, with witnesses and third persons,
and with a court on behalf of the client. It is through effective
communication with the client that an attorney can first inspire the client's
confidence and trust, building the basis of a productive attorney-client
relationship. 18  Without effective communication skills, the attorney is
unlikely to learn all of the facts and circumstances relevant to resolve the
client's legal problem or objectives. Communication is also critical when
the attorney seeks to advise a client about legal options or to recommend a
desirable course of action.19
Effective communication in a legal context is not simply an
uncomplicated exchange of information. It requires specialized abilities,
15. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 140-41.
16. Id. at 138-40. There is some overlap among these skills, but the Report's structured list is
useful in isolating and analyzing in depth many of the skills that are necessary for law practice.
17. See GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10, at 473-74; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 172-
75.
18. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
To CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING § 5.6 (1999).
19. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 161.
many of which are not intuitive, but must be learned.2 ° Communication in a
lawyer-client relationship depends not only on the overt transmission and
reception of information, but may be affected by emotional and interpersonal
factors, and by the concerns, assumptions, and goals of the client.2 A
lawyer must be able to assess these factors, understand the perspective of the
client, and tailor the communication to suit the purpose of the
communication.22 A lawyer also must be able to organize information
logically for the listener and convey ideas clearly, precisely, with economy,
and by choosing appropriate words.23
It is the lawyer's responsibility to make sure the communication
achieves its goals. Being a successful communicator requires that lawyers
not only be able to impart information efficiently; lawyers must have certain
"people skills" that will help them communicate with different personalities
and elicit all information pertinent to the client's problem.24 Coimunication
skills and client-relation skills also become important for instilling
confidence and for client development and retention, which are a significant
part of the practice of law.25 Lawyers' poor communication and client
relation skills contribute more generally to the negative public perception of
lawyers.26
Communication skills provide a necessary foundation for the other
essential lawyering skills of client interviewing and fact gathering, and client
counseling.27 Those skills, in turn, are important to a lawyer's overall
problem solving abilities.
Client interviewing and fact investigation skills enable a lawyer to
obtain the information from the client that is necessary for solving the
client's legal problem. 28 The facts of a client's case will trigger certain legal
consequences and not others, so a lawyer must discover all potentially
relevant facts. Without a full understanding of these facts, the lawyer will
not be able to identify all legal issues, find the applicable legal rules, predict
how a court would handle the case, and evaluate possible solutions to the
client's problem.29
20. See generally COCHRAN, supra note 18.
21. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 173-75.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 173-74.
24. Id. at 166-68, 178-79; see SCHILTZ -LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 721 n. 41.
25. See Neil Hamilton, Is Law School Relevant to the Practice of Law? MINNESOTA LAWYER,
May 19, 2003, at 4 [hereinafter HAMILTON - IS LAW SCHOOL RELEVANT]; RHODE, supra note 8, at
198-99; SONSTENG & CAMAROT-rO, supra note 10, at 336-39; GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10, at
474.
26. See HAMILTON - IS LAW SCHOOL RELEVANT, supra note 25.
27. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 172.
28. Id. at 141-42, 166-68.
29. Id. at 141-48, 163-64.
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Client interviewing requires both basic and specialized communication
skills. 30 A lawyer must be adept at general communication processes, as
well as the peculiar interpersonal dynamics that can be involved in client
interviewing.31  A lawyer must be a sympathetic listener, a careful
questioner, and a shrewd judge of people and situations. Clients who need
an attorney's help are facing problems they cannot solve by themselves and
may be suffering from extreme stress. 32 During an interview, the lawyer
must be able to establish rapport with a client and make the client feel
comfortable enough to reveal relevant information that the client may prefer
not to disclose.33 The lawyer must be able to listen actively and to correctly
interpret both verbal and nonverbal communications from the client.34
In gathering facts from the client, the lawyer must know how to ask
questions in the way best suited to inspire confidence, honesty, and full
disclosure by the client. Both memory and observation are subjective, and
the process of reconstructing events is affected by biases, interests,
expectations, and personality.35 The lawyer must be able to discover the
client's motivations and understand the client's perspective. The lawyer
must be able to obtain the most complete and accurate version of the facts
from the client.
In interviewing a client, the lawyer also must be observant enough to
recognize signs of trouble during the interview. 36 For example, a client may
react negatively to something in the lawyer's manner, feel uncomfortable
disclosing information that is embarrassing, or exaggerate or skew the facts
favorably to the client.37 Or there may be significant cultural factors that
could impede the communication.3 8 If the lawyer does not have the skills to
recognize and heed these potential problems, the representation will not be a
success.
30. See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 79-
106 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter KRIEGER & NEUMANN]; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 167-
68.
31. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 167; KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 81-85.
32. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 81, 101-02.
33. ALI-ABA, ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW: THE LAWYER'S GUIDE 328-
29 (2d ed. 2000); KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 101-02.
34. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 81-85; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 174.
35. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 63-65 (quoting MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 152-55 (1990)).
36. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 100-04.
37. Id.at81.
38. Id. at 49-5 7.
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Counseling, the next necessary lawyering skill, serves the central
objective of the lawyer-client relationship.3 9 It is for expert legal advice that
clients seek the assistance of a lawyer. As counselors, lawyers provide
clients with an informed understanding of their legal rights and obligations
and explain the impact of the law on the client's own situation.a
Effective counseling requires that the lawyer be able to communicate
advice in a way that the client will understand and find helpful.4' In
counseling a client, the lawyer must strike a balance between objectivity, in
order to recognize issues or options the client does not see, and partisanship,
in order to understand the client's point of view and communicate the
lawyer's commitment to protecting the client's interests.4 2 Counseling
requires that the lawyer understand the client's goals and motivations; the
client's concerns about possible costs, risks, or consequences; and the extent
to which the client's perspective may differ from the lawyer' s.
43
Counseling requires more than just knowledge of the ethical rules that
define the nature and bounds of the lawyer's role as an adviser. 4  The
lawyer as counselor owes the client moral advice as well as technical legal
skill.45 The law often does not provide sufficient guidance for a lawyer
counseling a client and may permit "a great deal of discretion." 6 In those
situations, the lawyer must be able to use intuition, conscience, training, and
judgment to approach the client's problems and give sensible advice. 7
However, professional judgment is not innate, but develops gradually
through experience and reflection.a
39. See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV.
527, 533 (1994) (citing DAVID BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 259-60 (1991)).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. [2] (2003).
41. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 180.
42. Id. at 177-78.
43. Id. at 178-79.
44. Id. at 177.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003). Model Rule 2.1 provides, "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation."
However, some critics charge that a lawyer's duty should be confined to the technical and that
anything more smacks of paternalism. See WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS, THE PUBLIC
OBLIGATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL 67 (2001) [hereinafter MAY].
46. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L. J. 1545, 1598 (1995).
47. Id. at 1607-08; see SCHILTZ - LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 721 n. 41.
48. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Teaching Practical Wisdom, 55 S.C. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (2003)
(noting that research strongly indicates that practical wisdom is best learned experientially); see also
David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995) [hereinafter LUBAN & MILLEMANN] (positing that good judgment can be
innate, but also that it can be taught through practice and experience); Paul Brest, The Responsibility
of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
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Finally, clients expect their lawyers to be effective problem solvers. "At
their best, lawyers serve as society's general problem solvers, skilled in
avoiding as well as resolving disputes and in facilitating public and private
ordering."49  In surveys of lawyers, the "ability to diagnose and plan
solutions to legal problems" is ranked high among important practice
skills,50 as is the ability to integrate facts and law and exercise good
judgment on behalf of the client.5 1 Legal problem solving requires that a
lawyer call upon a variety of individual skills to solve a problem. The
lawyer must identify and diagnose the client's problem, gather and analyze
relevant facts, evaluate applicable legal rules, generate solutions to the
problem, exercise professional judgment in advising the client about the
options, and implement the chosen course of action. 2 In practice, these
steps are not neatly separated.13 Lawyers must be able to handle a complex
situation as an integrated whole and to address many unknowns with clients,
sometimes in a rapidly changing situation. 4 This synthesis of all necessary
lawyering skills required to solve a client's problem is difficult to learn in a
classroom.
B. Professional Ethics and Judgment
Fundamental lawyering skills include more than those necessary for
technical proficiency. Lawyers also need ethical judgment and decision
making ability. They must be able to recognize and resolve the issues
relating to ethical duties and professional values that may arise in a lawyer's
relationship with clients.55 Lawyers must be able to identify ethical
problems, determine how to act, and resist the pressure to act improperly.
5 6
PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 5, 7 [hereinafter BREST] (noting that the case method may help
develop professional judgment by giving students repeated practice in problem solving).
49. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 811,
811 (1999) [hereinafter BREST & KRIEGER- LAWYERS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS].
50. See, e.g., SONSTENG & CAMAROT-O, supra note 10, at 335 (citing GARTH & MARTIN, supra
note 10, at 472-73).
51. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 326 (1995).
52. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 141-51.
53. KRIEGER& NEUMANN, supra note 30, at 28.
54. See BREST, supra note 48, at 7.
55. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 203-06; see also Robert P. Bums, Legal Ethics in
Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L. REV. 684, 684-85 (1996).
56. See Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 357, 360-61 (1998).
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Moral decision making involves identifying which principle is most
important in a given situation, and that requires judgment.5 7
In the nature of law practice ... conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living .... Within the
framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules .... "
Ethical judgment requires a lawyer to look beyond the narrow interests
of the client and to recognize the costs and consequences of alternative
courses of action to others. 9 It develops from experience, common sense,
instinct,60 personal conscience, and the regard of professional peers.6 1 Many
believe that ethical lawyering is an acquired habit that is reflected in the
decisions good lawyers make every day,62 and acquired habits come from
practice and experience.
In fact, all of these necessary client-focused skills are learned primarily
by observation and experience. Theory provides a foundation for learning,
but it is in the practice of these skills--communication, client interviewing
and fact investigation, client counseling, problem solving, and the exercise
of ethical judgment-that students actually learn them. To be effective,
legal education should combine instruction in theoretical knowledge with
repeated practice.
III. THE CONTENT AND METHODS OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION
The dominant model of instruction at most American law schools
remains traditional. The case method approach requires students to dissect
appellate court opinions to extract key legal rules and reasoning, and then to
57. See LUBAN & MILLEMANN, supra note 48, at 39.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. [9] (2003).
59. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 119 (1994) [hereinafter SHAFFER & COCHRAN].
60. See SCHILTZ- LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 718-19; see also Mary Jo Eyster,
Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and Moral Judgment, 75 NEB. L. REv. 752, 761 (1996)
(discussing ethical judgment in the context of negotiation).
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbi. [7] (2003).
62. See Pepper, supra note 46, at 1608 (arguing that moral character itself is made up of habits of
moral perception and conduct, and that one acquires moral habits from parents, teachers, and
mentors, and from growing in a community that embraces a moral tradition); SCHILTZ - ON BEING
AN ETHICAL LAWYER, supra note 8, at 911-12, 949; see also SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 59,
at 113.
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apply those principles to new hypothetical facts. Originally, the purpose of
this approach was to have students identify the core principles of the
common law, but eventually the emphasis shifted from learning doctrine to
learning process.63 The case method became a means of teaching students
analytical habits of mind. However, even in the early days of the case
method, practitioners questioned its effectiveness in training lawyers
because of its difficulty and inefficiency in teaching legal rules.
64
In the eighteenth-century infancy of the legal profession in America, the
predominant method of legal education was largely self-directed and
consisted of some form of apprenticeship under the tutelage of a practicing
lawyer.65 Legal apprentices would work (and sometimes pay for the
privilege of working) in a lawyer's office to observe and learn from the
senior lawyer, and would read law books on their own to acquire knowledge
of doctrinal rules.66
Both rule mastery and practical skills were recognized as important for
new lawyers. "The best system would be ... to require that all applicants
[for admission to the bar] should learn the principles of the law in a school,
then apply them for at least a year in an office, and finally pass a public
examination by impartial examiners appointed by the courts. 67 However,
there was criticism of the abuses of the apprenticeship system by busy or
neglectful supervising lawyers and a growing movement toward formal
university-based legal education in the late nineteenth century.68 By 1930,
most states had bar exams, and both law school and law office training were
acceptable ways for preparing for practice. By that time, few states still
required a law office apprenticeship period for students.69 In the following
decades, most states moved away from practical training toward formal law
school classroom instruction as the primary method for educating lawyers.
In more recent years, critics have condemned the "disjunction" between
the methods of American legal education and the need of the legal
63. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 52-56.
64. Id. at 57-58.
65. Id. at 3 (noting that "of the thirteen original states, only one [Virginia] had no prescribed
period of training at all").
66. Id. at 3, 10-11 n.5.
67. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Lewis L. Delafield, The Conditions of Admission to the Bar, 7 PA.
MONTHLY 968, 969 (1876)). This is the system of legal education adopted by many foreign legal
systems. See infra note 133.
68. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 3, 24 ("No doubt what was meant by apprenticeship varied
considerably from an important educational experience to gross exploitation .....
69. Id. at 174.
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profession for properly trained, ethical practitioners. 70  They have charged
that law schools are concerned too much with theory and have neglected
teaching the skills necessary for even basic competence in law practice.
Most lawyers believe that law schools teach theory and legal analysis well,7'
but they fault law schools for neglecting other necessary lawyering skills,
especially those involving client contact.72 Law schools place relatively
little emphasis on teaching client-focused skills and ethical values, 73 and
formal American legal education typically ends without much required
practical skills or ethics training. New lawyers have to learn these skills
haphazardly on the job, often without the guidance of a mentor attorney.74
Formal standards governing legal education and bar admission impose
few skills training requirements. 75  The American Bar Association's
standards for law school accreditation require generally that "[a] law school
shall maintain an educational program that prepares its students for
admission to the bar, and effective and responsible participation in the legal
profession. 7 6  As part of this general charge, law schools must provide
students with "substantial instruction in ... professional skills generally
regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal
profession," as well as "substantial opportunities for live-client or other real-
life practice experiences. '77 However, law schools are not required to offer
clinical or field placement experiences to every student, and schools have
great flexibility in meeting the requirement of substantial instruction.
70. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 232-33
(1973); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
71. See Student Practice as a Method of Legal Education and a Means of Providing Legal
Assistance to Indigents: An Empirical Study, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353, 371-73 (1973)
[hereinafter STUDENT PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION]. But see Edwards, supra
note 70 (criticizing law schools for not focusing sufficiently on teaching doctrinal skills, inter alia).
72. See STUDENT PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 71, at 371-73; see
also GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10; SONSTENG & CAMAROTTO, supra note 10, at 349.
73. RHODE, supra note 8, at 197; BREST, supra note 48, at 5 (arguing for a complementary
curriculum of advanced courses integrating lawyering skills with insights from other disciplines).
74. SONSTENG & CAMAROTTO, supra note 10, at 330.
75. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 18-20 (2005-06) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
76. Id. at 18, Standard 301(a).
77. Id. at 18-19, Standards 302(a)(4), 302(b)(1). Standard 302(b)(1) requires that a law school
provide students with "substantial opportunities for live-client or other real-life practice experiences,
appropriately supervised and designed to encourage reflection by students on their experiences and
on the values and responsibilities of the legal profession, and the development of one's ability to
assess his or her performance and level of competence."
78. Id., Interpretation 302-5. In a recent ABA survey, twenty-nine percent of the 152 law
schools responding reported that they required a "skills, simulation, clinical or externship
experience" for graduation. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA, 1992-2002, 20-21 (2003) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY OF
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA]. Due to the broad wording of the question however, it does not reveal
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Beyond law school, only a minority of jurisdictions require that graduates
complete certain courses or skills training for licensing.79 In most states, law
school graduates must pass only a bar examination and a character and
fitness investigation before being allowed to perform all the functions of an
attorney.8 °
Given how important it is for law practice for students to learn
fundamental lawyering skills and professional values, it is remarkable that
American legal education still provides so few opportunities for skills
training. In even shorter supply are the opportunities for students to learn
skills and values by the most effective method: by learning experientially in
an authentic practice setting.
IV. EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Experiential learning should play a significant role in a law student's
preparation for law practice. Educational philosopher John Dewey spoke
decades ago of "the organic connection between education and personal
experience."'" "[E]ducation in order to accomplish its ends both for the
individual learner and for society must be based upon experience ....
When a student learns in an authentic context, the learning that occurs is
the percentage of schools that specifically require a live-client clinic experience. Anecdotal
conversations with clinicians suggest that less than ten percent of schools require an in-house live-
client clinic course.
79. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (2002)
[hereinafter NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS], available at
http://www.ncbex.org/pubs/pdf/031505_COMPGUIDE2005.pdf (noting in chart IV that Alaska,
Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina require either ethics instruction or some kind of "bridge-
the-gap" skills training before admission; Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Rhode Island, and West Virginia require either a professionalism or skills training
course within one year of admission; New Hampshire and Utah require a skills course within two
years of admission; New Jersey requires a skills course within three years; Nevada requires a bridge-
the-gap course; and Vermont requires six months of law office study). See also ABA TASK FORCE
ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENT
PROTECTION & WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1,6
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce-rpt-429.pdf.
80. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, supra note 79. About thirty states have added a
practice skills test (the Multistate Performance Test) to their bar exam that requires test takers to
analyze a hypothetical client file and write a related document. The list of jurisdictions using the test
is available on the website of the National Conference of Bar Examiners:
http://www.ncbex.org/tests.htm.
81. Baker, supra note 14, at 324-25 (citing JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION 12
(1954)).
82. DEWEY, supra note 81, at 113.
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deeper and more meaningful, because the sense of personal involvement
infuses that learning with special meaning and richness.83
In legal education especially, the difference between the emphasis of the
traditional classroom and the demands of law practice can be striking.
Practical experience is a powerful teacher, but law schools rarely provide
students with enough of it.8
4
If it were not for a tradition which blinds us, would we not
consider it ridiculous that, with litigation laboratories just
around the corner, law schools confine their students to
what they can learn about litigation in books? What would
we say of a medical school where students were taught
surgery solely from the printed page?... Who would learn
golf from a golf instructor, contenting himself with sitting
in the locker-room analyzing newspaper accounts of
important golf-matches that had been played by someone
else several years before?
85
For lawyers, repeated experience is the leading source of learning for
the skills of oral and written communication, client relations, and fact
gathering.86 But students rarely are able to get consistent exposure to actual
law practice during their law school years and therefore do not learn these
skills before graduation. 87 Even though lawyers are allowed to represent
legal clients immediately upon licensing in most states, many new law
graduates are unequipped for this responsibility.
In addition to learning by hands-on practice and experience, students
can absorb a great deal just by observing practicing lawyers at work with
clients.88 Observation can improve a student's own lawyering skills by
making an abstract problem concrete and by helping the student understand
the demands and dynamics of a lawyering situation.89 Observing the
interactions between an experienced attorney and client can teach students
about the subtleties of client characteristics, behavior, and needs, as well as
about the required attention, flexibility, and responses a lawyer must use to
guide the working relationship. Students also can observe in a meaningful
context how ethical issues arise, and learn how a lawyer recognizes and
83. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal
Internship, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1995) [hereinafter GIVELBER].
84. GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10, at 482.
85. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 229 (1950).
86. See GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10, at 482.
87. Seeid.at491.
88. J.P. OGILVY, LEAH WORTHAM & LISA G. LERMAN, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE, A
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL EXTERNS 113-14 (1998).
89. Id. at 116-17.
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resolves them. "Exposure to law practice may be the only way through
which students can really begin to understand the written and unwritten
standards of law practice and the degree to which those standards are
followed." 90
Simulations are not a substitute for live-client interactions, even though
they certainly can add value to traditional law school teaching methods. 91
Role playing, even with skilled actors, does not have the feeling of reality
and therefore does not demand as much from students as does live-client
work.92 Simulation does not involve the level of responsibility for results
that live-client experience entails. 93  "Even the best simulation-based
courses... provide make believe experiences with no real consequences on
the line. 94 Simulation also lacks the complexity that leads to the depth of
learning possible in experiences involving real clients.95 "We cannot be said
truly to understand anything until we understand it in context and in
complexity.
96
The shortage of experiential learning opportunities in legal education
contrasts sharply with those in medical education, which prepares students
for another learned profession requiring both theoretical knowledge and
practical skills. Medical students are exposed to experiential learning in
clinical settings early in their medical studies. Long before they are licensed
to practice, they participate in clinical training and case studies with licensed
physicians and real patients to learn essential skills by observation and
90. Clinical Legal Educ. Ass'n, Best Practices for Legal Education 151 (Dec. 15, 2005),
http://professionalism.law.sc.edu/downloads/bestpractices/20051215-Text.pdf [hereinafter BEST
PRACTICES].
91. See, e.g., id. at 151. See also SONSTENG & CAMAROTTO, supra note 10, at 349 (citing John
Sonsteng et al., Learning by Doing: Preparing Law Students for the Practice of Law, The Legal
Practicum, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 111, 116-117 (1995) [hereinafter SONSTENG ET AL. -
LEARNING BY DOING]). The Sonsteng & Camarotto article notes that a "controlled simulation [can
provide] clear objectives, reinforcement, and feedback, positive learning environments,
accommodation of various learning styles, and a consistent lesson cycle." SONSTENG &
CAMAROTTO, supra note 10, at 349. See also Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 469, 471 (1995) (noting that simulations "motivate students, provide a significant
degree of experiential learning along a number of dimensions, and can effectively introduce or teach
skills as well as substance").
92. Richard Grimes, The Theory and Practice of Clinical Legal Education, in TEACHING
LAWYERS' SKILLS 140 (Julian Webb & Caroline Maughan eds., 1996).
93. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 90, at 151.
94. Id.
95. Marjorie Anne MeDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House Clinics
Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 239, 287-88 (1990).
96. Id. at 287.
experience.97  A number of these skills parallel those necessary for law
practice. For example, medical students must learn to communicate
effectively with the patient to ensure the success of the doctor-patient
relationship. 98 They must learn to interview patients carefully to obtain the
facts necessary for an accurate diagnosis.99 They must learn to factor into
their analyses the personal characteristics and circumstances of a patient
who may be uncommunicative or in considerable distress.100 They must
decide when additional fact investigation is important.'0 ' They must learn
how to counsel patients about different treatment options, explaining
procedures and the benefits and risks of those options. 10 2 Medical students
learn these skills by observing experienced practitioners and by practicing
them, with supervision, on real patients.'0 3 Experiential learning is no less
important for acquiring the skills to be a lawyer.
A. The Importance of Experiential Learning
Each of the client-focused practice skills discussed previously is learned
best by experience, and the earlier the better. For example, effective
communication skills are acquired by observation and practice. Indeed,
higher level interpersonal social and communication skills are developed
only in active learning situations, and not by lecture in a classroom.'
t
Although the case method makes a law classroom more active than lecture
for the reciting students, the ability to "think like a lawyer" taught by the
case method does not necessarily translate into effective client
97. See Erin A. Egan, et. al., Comparing Ethics Education in Medicine and Law: Combining the
Best of Both Worlds, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 303 (2004) (comparing the formalized ethics
instruction of law schools with the more informal process of socialization and customary
experiential learning in medical ethics education); Frederick W. Hafferty & Ronald Franks, The
Hidden Curriculum, Ethics Teaching, and the Structure of Medical Education, 69 ACAD. MED. 861
(1994) (discussing medical ethics training and arguing that most of what medical novices will
internalize comes not from the formal curriculum, but from a hidden curriculum that, for good or ill,
socializes students to accept the culture and values of the medical profession); John J. Costonis, The
MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 157 (1993) (advocating that law schools expand their financial resources so that law students
can obtain skills training comparable to that of medical students).
98. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils., Medical School Objectives Project, Report 1, Learning






103. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 97, at 158.
104. See TEACHING LAWYERS' SKILLS 13-18 (Julian Webb & Caroline Maughan eds., 1996).
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communication skills. 10 5 Law students learn these communication skills by
interacting with live clients and by observing an experienced lawyer during
client meetings. The context of live client contact generates deeper
understanding, learning, and retention for novices than other settings.
Reflecting upon their experiences and discussing them with a mentor
enriches the learning experience.
10 6
Students also come to appreciate the difficulty of client interviewing and
fact investigation by observing or participating in interviews between
lawyers and their clients. Extracting relevant facts from live human beings
is infinitely more challenging than reading the prepared facts of a case in an
edited court opinion. With real clients, students can observe a range of
different personalities and learn how a lawyer's approach to questioning
must adapt to the particular client's characteristics. They can observe how a
skilled lawyer can coax information from a reticent client, give focus to the
ramblings of a verbose client, put a worried client at ease, or impress a
nonchalant client with the seriousness of a situation. They can observe both
the verbal and non-verbal exchange of information between two persons
with a real stake in their working relationship. Finally, students can get a
sense of a client's non-legal concerns as well, and learn how lawyers must
often address more than strictly legal issues.'17
For counseling skills too, absorbing the words, actions, and demeanor of
both lawyer and client gives students a special perspective. 10 8 Lawyers must
be able to inspire their clients' trust. They may have to tell clients what they
do not want to hear or present clients with equally unpleasant options. They
may have to explain that the law does not afford a remedy. It is in
counseling a client that "people skills" are perhaps most important, and
observing experienced practitioners can help students develop those
abilities.'0 9
Problem-solving ability, which requires legal judgment and sound
analysis, is also most likely to develop with context and repeated
experience."0 "In every other human endeavor, experience in problem-
105. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the
Importance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225, 1229-33
(2004).
106. Steven Hartwell, Six Easy Pieces: Teaching Experientially, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1011,
1012-14 (2004); HAMILTON - Is LAW SCHOOL RELEVANT, supra note 25, at 4.
107. See BREST & KRIEGER - LAWYERS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS, supra note 49, at 811.
108. SCHILTZ- LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5 (discussing the value of mentors).
109. Id.; see GARTH & MARTIN, supra note 10, at 482.
110. BREST & KRIEGER - LAWYERS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS, supra note 49; RHODE, supra note 8,
at 199.
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solving is acquired by solving problems. There may be better and worse
ways to learn to solve problems, but there appears to be no substitute for
context.""' In observing client meetings, students can learn how a lawyer
must synthesize the intricate dimensions of practice. Lawyers generally
encounter unstructured situations in which the issues have not been
identified in advance, and without exposure to the demands and constraints
of such situations, students' problem-solving skills cannot mature." 
2
Finally, context and experience are also critical in learning professional
responsibility and ethical judgment. The law school years have a profound
influence on students' professional values and their understanding of ethical
practice,1"3 but by teaching law students to focus primarily on rules and to
screen out other concerns, law schools may frustrate the development of
students' own moral judgment." 4
Because ethics rules focus on the relationships between the lawyer and
the client, bench, bar, and public, 15 students must learn how the rules work
within those relationships. By observing and participating in conversations
with clients struggling with legal problems, students begin to understand an
attorney's role and a client's expectations, and to grasp the practical and
ethical challenges of the rules and duties that will govern their professional
careers.
Students need practical ethical training to develop the reflective
judgment necessary to wrestle with difficult questions. 1 6 Exposing students
to situations that require ethical judgment within a confidential relationship
is especially important, because it is in confidential conversations with
clients that a lawyer will first recognize potential ethical problems and have
to address them.", 7 "[M]uch of what a lawyer does is done in private-
I 1. Blasi, supra note 51, at 386-87 (calling for law schools at least to "replicate in hypothetical
'problems' as closely as possible the complexities and nuances of a situation that might arise in
practice, including the ever present background noise of only potentially relevant detail").
112. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 90, at 151; BREST, supra note 48, at 5, 7.
113. LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 5, at 9-10.
114. See Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study,
48 FLA. L. REv. 197, 216-19 (1996); Eyster, supra note 60, at 755-56. Although Professor Eyster's
article focuses on teaching ethical negotiation practice, and not skills of client interviewing and
counseling, she notes:
I do not think that the problems of developing a satisfactory ethic of legal professionalism
begin and end with negotiation; I think, instead, that the tensions which arise in the
teaching and practice of negotiation are an important indicator of the extent of our failure
to adequately incorporate the notion of moral judgment in our standards of professional
responsibility.
Eyster, supra note 60, at 757 (footnote omitted).
115. James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits
of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 83,98 (1991).
116. Edwards, supra note 70, at 38.
117. SCHILTZ- LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 711-12.
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indeed, in situations that are secret by force of law.""'  Although exposure
to law practice may not be efficient in transmitting doctrinal rules, it is more
effective than classroom instruction for teaching the standards and values of
the legal profession. l 9 Finally, exposure to law practice can also inspire a
student's commitment to professionalism.'20
B. Experiential Learning Through Mentoring and Apprenticeships
Learning by experience, however valuable, can be difficult and
inefficient if it happens without guidance. The richest possibilities for
learning occur when a student encounters the day-to-day demands of law
practice under the direction of an attorney-mentor. Working with a mentor
can help a student acquire essential skills and professional values early and
significantly reduce the risks to clients of being represented by a newly
licensed attorney. 121  Experienced attorneys can serve as role models for
students not only in displaying technical proficiency, but also in exercising
sound judgment in difficult circumstances.
Mentors can model the attitudes, habits, and virtues that characterize
good attorneys as well. 122  They can model professionalism in personal
interactions and diligence in managing legal work. They can display ethical
judgment in difficult situations. 123  They can awaken students to the
competing pressures and demands and the need for balance in professional
118. Id. at 714.
119. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 90, at 84-87, 158.
120. Id.
121. Required apprenticeships have their critics. The "standard litany of concerns" is that the
work may be trivial and repetitive, that the quality of supervision may be poor, and that the work
lacks sufficient educational value. See, e.g., GIVELBER, supra note 83, at 7-9. Joseph Story believed
that "the dry and uninviting drudgery" of the law offices of his day were "utterly inadequate to lay a
just foundation for accurate knowledge in the learning of the law." 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH
STORY 486 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
122. Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV.
161, 275 (2002). At least one study has shown that apprentice-like employment experiences have a
significant impact (for good or ill) on new lawyers' ethical and professional attitudes. Lawrence K.
Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students' Professional Values:
Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 537-39 (1991).
123. Arguably some lawyers in a work environment could serve as poor role models and influence
a law student or new lawyer negatively. Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral
Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1996); Hellman, supra note 122, at 537-38. However,
Professor Patrick J. Schiltz maintains that volunteer attorney-mentors are different, because they are
"almost by definition people who value something other than money" even in the face of intense
pressure to bill hours to clients. See SCHILTZ - LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 731 n.
78.
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life. 12 4  Indeed, mentors can have a profound effect on the ethical
development of law students by influencing the formation of character at a
critical stage of their education and by helping them to integrate their own
moral values into their professional lives. 125  "Some of what experienced
lawyers know seems capable of transmission to younger lawyers only
through the process of individual mentoring or apprenticeship."'
' 26
Mentoring can connect novices to their mentors, future clients, and other
members of the legal community. 127  Attorney-mentors socialize students
into the profession by exposing them to the moral and ethical dimensions of
law practice and allowing them to observe the standards of experienced
attorneys. 128  Regular contact with attorney-mentors serves to initiate
novices into the culture and language of the profession, and the values and
beliefs of practitioners. 1
29
These connections implicate fundamental responsibilities of the bar. As
members of a self-regulating profession, lawyers must ensure that those
entering the profession are competent and have learned the profession's
shared ethical norms.130  This is not an abstract, collective responsibility.
Each lawyer has an ethical obligation to improve the competence of the bar
and to ensure its integrity. 13' By providing novices with practice experience
and modeling ethical behavior, mentoring allows individual attorneys to
discharge one of the profession's core responsibilities: protecting the public
by helping to educate new lawyers. 32 Despite its widely recognized value
by other legal systems, 133 individual mentoring has declined in the American
124. SCHILTZ -LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 732.
125. Id.; see Patrick J. Schiltz, Making Ethical Lawyers, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 875 (2004); THOMAS
SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 130 (1986).
126. Blasi, supra note 51, at 388 (but noting that to the extent some expert knowledge can be
generalized, "it can be learned in less mentor-intensive settings"); see also BREST, supra note 48, at
5,17.
127. SCHILTZ -LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 735-36.
128. See Neil W. Hamilton, The Ethics of Peer Review in the Academic and Legal Professions, 42
S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 237 (2001) [hereinafter HAMILTON - THE ETHICS OF PEER REVIEW]; Neil
Hamilton, Building the Social Capital of the Profession, MINNESOTA LAWYER, Mar. 17, 2003
[hereinafter HAMILTON - BUILDING THE SOCIAL CAPITAL]; John Law, Articling in Canada, 43 S.
TEX. L. REV. 449, 460 (2002).
129. See Law, supra note 128, at 470; Pepper, supra note 46, at 1608.
130. See generally HAMILTON - THE ETHICS OF PEER REVIEW, supra note 128; HAMILTON -
BUILDING THE SOCIAL CAPITAL, supra note 128. See also Law, supra note 128, at 470.
131. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1980).
132. See Law, supra note 128, at 469; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 103-105, 287.
133. In many countries, the norm for professional preparation requires that new law graduates
complete a period of practical training under an experienced attorney before licensing. See, e.g.,
Law, supra note 128, at 449; Lynette G. MeLennan & Peter J. Norman, The Legal System of
Australia, in 2 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.6 (C)-(D) (Kenneth R. Redden ed.,
1989); CATHERINE ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 113-18 (2d ed. 1998);
DAVID M. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 350-58 (2d ed. 1997); Alain A. LeVasseur, The
Legal System of France, in 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.6 (B)(2)(a)(ii) (Kenneth R.
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legal profession over the years.1 34  The pressure on lawyers to produce
billable hours, meet clients' demands, and cultivate new clients leaves little
time for intensive mentoring of new attorneys. 135 Not coincidently, the job
market for law graduates has become increasingly competitive, and
employers expect new lawyers to be ready for practice upon graduation and
licensing, with little additional guidance.
However, the absence of mentoring can lead to declining
professionalism, unethical conduct, and a sense of anonymity within the
professional legal community. Courts have observed that the lack of
supervision of novice lawyers, much less collegial support or guidance, can
cause considerable damage to those lawyers and their clients. 136 Because
new graduates no longer are likely to receive significant mentoring in their
early years of practice, it is essential that students have opportunities to learn
experientially from attorney-mentors during their law school years.
C. The Shortage of Experiential Learning Opportunities in Law Schools
Although learning and professional development should continue
throughout a lawyer's career, the most formative stage of legal education
occurs during the law school years. 137  Students in law school are "as
receptive to being taught as they will ever be."'138 It is during law school that
students begin to explore their vision of what it means to be a good attorney
and how to realize that vision. Experiential learning during the law school
years is an important means not only to sustain student interest and develop
Redden ed., 2001); Helmuth Aldinger, The Legal System of the Federal Republic of Germany, in 3
MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.4 (A)(1)(b) (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 2001); Louis F.
Del Duca, The Legal System ofItaly, in 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.7 (Kenneth R.
Redden ed., 2001); 4 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.11 (B) (Kenneth R. Redden ed.,
1989) (Switzerland); DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 232 (2003). This apprenticeship period gives the new law graduate a
structured means of preparing for law practice through experiential learning, skills training, and
instruction in proper professional habits and attitudes. See Law, supra note 128.
134. SCHILTZ - LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 739.
135. Id. at 744 n. 138; Edwards, supra note 70, at 38; Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by
Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 273 (1994);
Louise A. LaMothe, Where Have All the Mentors Gone?, 19 LITIGATION I (Winter 1993).
136. See, e.g., In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923, 925 (N.J. 1982); In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801, 803
(N.J. 1985).
137. See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law
School?, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48, 57 (2003); Robert MacCrate, Keynote Address-The 21st Century
Lawyer: Is There a Gap to be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 517, 524 (1994).
138. SCHILTZ - LEGAL ETHICS IN DECLINE, supra note 5, at 776. See also MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 3.
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practice skills, but also to further students' ethical development. 39 Exposure
to practicing lawyers and real clients shows them in the most authentic way
what it means to be a lawyer. Teaching necessary skills in law school
protects the public as well. "[I]t is preferable for an aspiring attorney to
acquire the skills he will need in practice while a student, under professional
supervision, than to do so at the expense of the first clients who walk
through the newly licensed attorney's office door."'
140
In traditional doctrinal classes, students may get little sense of law
practice as problem-solving for real people. In the typical first-year
curriculum, studying appellate opinions makes the law seem remote for
those students whose passion for people brought them to law school.' 41 By
the second year, class "attendance, preparation, and participation decline,"
and students may lose much of the enthusiasm for helping people that
initially interested them in the law, unless they have contact with real clients
in a clinical program, volunteer work, or paid employment.
142
Unfortunately, the number of opportunities for hands-on experiential
learning and mentoring is limited at most law schools, mostly for economic
reasons. Because the student/faculty ratio in live-client clinical courses must
be low, the cost of instruction is dramatically higher than the cost of typical
doctrinal classes, in which one professor can teach dozens of students at a
time. As a consequence, only a fraction of all students take law clinic or
extemship courses in which they represent real clients under the supervision
of a law faculty member or outside attorney.
The bar itself has acknowledged significant shortcomings in legal
education. The MacCrate Report found it unrealistic to expect even the most
committed law schools, without help from the practicing bar, to produce
graduates who are fully prepared to represent clients without supervision. 143
The response of law schools and the profession to the MacCrate Report's
calls for educational reform has been mixed.' 44  Many law schools
139. Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum
Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51 (2001).
140. STUDENT PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 71, at 421. New
lawyers may assume the responsibility for representing clients before they are ready to serve those
clients. A significant number of law graduates still enter solo or small-firm practice immediately
after law school and licensing, and therefore may not have the benefit of experienced attorney-
mentors or supervisors. See Mark Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demographic
Transformation of the Legal Profession and its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services,
1999 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1090 (1999) (noting that of the roughly 700,000 lawyers engaged in private
practice in 1999, about 47 percent were in solo practice).
141. See Maranville, supra note 139, at 53.
142. ld. at 51.
143. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
144. See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing its Impact and
Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 109, 116 (2001).
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implemented at least modest curricular reforms in response to the MacCrate
Report; others approached skills and values training more aggressively. 141
The challenge for law schools is to make opportunities for experiential
learning more widely available to students, and partnerships between law
schools and the practicing bar raise a number of promising possibilities. The
MacCrate Report visualized law teachers, practicing lawyers, and members
of the judiciary as engaged in a common enterprise-building an educational
continuum for all lawyers, from law school throughout a lawyer's
professional life. 14 6 Law schools can realize that vision by bringing together
students and the practicing bar in their communities for experiential learning
through externships, clinical programs, pro bono activities, and mentorship
programs. 1
47
D. Innovative Approaches to Providing Experiential Learning
Although clinical courses involve the most intensive and realistic kind
of experiential learning, they are not the only vehicle for experiential
learning. The expansion of law school sponsored mentoring and externship
programs involving practicing attorneys could offer new educational
experiences for law students by allowing them to observe and experience
law practice outside of the classroom, while also learning analytical skills
and legal doctrine inside. 148  Mentoring programs could complement a
school's clinical offerings and make at least limited live-client contact
possible for a much larger percentage of law students before graduation.
The American Bar Association has encouraged law schools to be
creative in developing instruction in professional skills related to a lawyer's
practice responsibilities, using the strengths and resources available to the
school. 149 The MacCrate Report, in turn, urged the practicing bar to live up
to its responsibility of mentoring law students and new lawyers. 5° If law
schools cooperated with the bar to place students in mentored practice
145. Id. at 123. See also SONSTENG ET AL. - LEARNING BY DOING, supra note 91; Graham C.
Lilly, Skills, Values, and Education: The MacCrate Report Finds a Home in Wisconsin, 80 MARQ.
L. REV. 753 (1997).
146. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-8.
147. Id. at 6, 333.
148. As of 2002, only a minority of law schools reported offering extemship placements with law
firms; most schools place extems with government agencies and courts. See ABA SURVEY OF LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULA, supra note 78, at 35-36.
149. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 75, Interpretation 302-1.
150. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 332 (recommendation number C.1 8.).
situations, a significant number of practicing attorneys might be able to
commit the limited time required for mentoring a law student. 151
One example of how law schools might provide cost-efficient mentoring
and experiential learning opportunities for students is in progress in
Minnesota. In 2001, the University of St. Thomas School of Law instituted
a required mentor externship program, in which every student was paired
with a volunteer mentor attorney or judge.'52 Unlike mentor/alumni
programs that are mostly social in nature, St. Thomas' program is academic
and structured, combining experiential learning with reflective lawyering.'53
The program provides each student with an attorney-mentor in all three
years of law school. 154  Students must complete a certain number of
designated learning "experiences" and spend a minimum number of hours in
mentor program activities each year.'55 The law school compiles the list of
approved experiences, which include a broad array of lawyering tasks (e.g.,
the student may observe a deposition, a settlement conference, or a motion
hearing, review a draft document with a mentor attorney, or attend a
mediation in which the mentor is participating). 56  Students observe or
participate in these lawyering tasks, record their experiences in a journal,
and together with their mentors try to reflect on broader issues common to
practicing lawyers. 57  This mentor externship program-voluntary for
mentor attorneys, but mandatory for students-provides students with
meaningful, even if limited, experiential learning at a fraction of the cost of
more traditional educational options. 118
Partnerships between law schools and the practicing bar hold great
promise for providing all students with relatively low cost experiential
learning opportunities, but their success may be frustrated by a peculiar
aspect of the attorney-client privilege rules. A strict reading of those rules
151. Cf SCHILTZ -ON BEING AN ETHICAL LAWYER, supra note 8, at 927 (noting that sustained
one-on-one mentoring of law firm associates is disappearing chiefly due to time pressures).
152. UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW
MENTOR EXTERNSHIP MANUAL 1 (2004) [hereinafter UST SCHOOL OF LAW MENTOR EXTERNSHIP




155. Id. at 5. First-year students must complete a minimum of four mentor "experiences" for a
total of at least twelve "experience hours" during the year. Id. Additionally, students attend an
orientation, prepare a professional development plan, attend small peer-group sessions, write two
short debriefing summaries of their experiences, and write a year-end evaluation. Id. Students also
log their activities and submit the log to the program director. Id. In the second and third years,
students must complete five mentor experiences for a total of at least fifteen experience hours, in
addition to meeting the other requirements of the first-year program. Id.
156. UST SCHOOL OF LAW MENTOR EXTERNSHIP MANUAL, supra note 152, at 10-12.
157. See id. at 1-12.
158. There are significant administrative costs associated with a required academic mentorship
program, but they do not approach the cost of providing clinical education for the same number of
students.
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prohibits the presence of unpaid law students in meetings involving
confidential communications between lawyer and client, with few
exceptions. Because the attorney-client privilege ordinarily does not apply
to law students, the practicing bar may have to exclude mentored law
students from client contact and experiential learning in those situations that
could teach them the most about skilled and ethical practice.
V. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS AN OBSTACLE
TO EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
"The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the
modem American lawyer's professional functions."' 59 The attorney-client
evidentiary privilege against disclosure enforces and protects a lawyer's
ethical duty of confidentiality, which is recognized as one of the most
fundamental duties an attorney owes to a client.160  Both the fiduciary
relationship existing between a lawyer and client and the proper functioning
of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of the client.1 6 ' The promise of confidentiality engenders trust,
which is critical to the proper working of the attorney-client relationship.
Attorneys must have full information from the client for effective
representation, 162 and clients are unlikely to reveal embarrassing or
incriminating information unless they know the information will remain
secret. In representing a client, the lawyer may need information that the
client otherwise has a right to keep confidential. By appeasing the client's
fears about revealing sensitive or unfavorable facts, the privilege makes it
more likely that the lawyer will obtain the information necessary for
159. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL.
L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1978).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003).
161. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980). The attorney confidentiality rules
have their critics. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5-
6 (1998) (arguing that confidentiality rules should be abolished because they benefit mainly the legal
profession by increasing the demand for legal services, and not clients or society: litigation is a
"zero-sum" game, and the gain to one party is offset by the loss to the other); see also Paul R. Rice,
Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE
L.J. 853, 861 (1998) (suggesting the attorney-client privilege should be abandoned because it results
in unnecessary burdens on the litigation process); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74
IOWA L. REv. 351, 353-56 (1989) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege is too inflexible and
often causes attorneys to violate ethical and moral obligations). This article is premised on the
current law of attorney-client privilege. If the privilege were abolished altogether and confidential
attorney-client communications were subject to discovery, lawyers would have no reason to exclude
law students from those client communications, and the law would not impede the goals of legal
education discussed in this article.
162. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,412 (1998).
advising the client or for advocating on the client's behalf.'63 Without the
privilege, the client might not disclose secrets in the first place, and this
justifies the loss of evidence that results from the privilege.' 64
The attorney-client privilege also furthers larger societal goals.
Confidentiality may encourage laymen to seek early legal assistance and
obtain the full advantage of the legal system. 165 Given the complexity of the
law, the privilege is important because it encourages citizens to use lawyers'
skills and expertise to protect their rights and navigate within the legal
system.166 A lawyer's loyalty to a client protects the citizen, right or wrong,
against an abuse of power by the government, and thus, confidentiality
protects the public interest. 167 Although detractors of the privilege argue that
it chiefly protects clients with "bad" secrets or intentions who benefit from
secrecy, even then confidentiality may enable the lawyer, who is in a
relationship of trust with the client, to exercise moral influence and give
advice that is not only important to the client, but is also socially
desirable. 168 Clients who trust their lawyers are more likely to accept the
lawyer's advice to do the right thing.
169
Thus, the privilege does not protect the client's secrets for the sake of
privacy, but rather is intended to promote broader interests, including respect
for the rule of law. 170 The privilege is directed at the proper working of the
legal system and the attorney-client relationship within it. The intended
beneficiary is not the individual client but the system-wide administration of
justice, which depends on frank and open client-attorney communication.171
163. See id. at 403, 407-08; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1998); PAUL
R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1: 12, at 38-41 (2d ed. 1999).
164. Swidler, 524 U.S. at408.
165. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003).
166. Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833).
167. MAY, supra note 45, at 53-54.
168. Id.; see also ROBERT F. COCHRAN & TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 7-8 (2d ed. 2003); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 59, at 119; Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 195, 214 (1986) ("[Tjhe lawyer in
modem business practice in the United States is a source of moral guidance for his clients.").
169. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 168, at 214-15 (detailing a situation in which a law firm
encouraged its client, an insurance company, to pay a claim that it was not legally required to pay
because it would be the "moral" thing to do).
170. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); In re Investigating Grand
Jury, 593 A.2d 402, 406 (Pa. 1991); State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz. 1979).
171. See In re Investigating Grand Jury, 593 A.2d at 406.
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The attorney-client privilege is recognized in all fifty states. 7 2  The
majority of states have codified the privilege, either by statute or by
evidentiary rule. However, even if the privilege is statutory, most courts
assert the inherent authority to adopt and to change evidentiary standards
(e.g., privilege rules) as they deem appropriate.'73 Only if the state
constitution confers rulemaking power on the legislature must a court defer
to statutory rules of evidence. 17 4  In federal courts, the Federal Rules of
172. ALA. R. EVID. 502; ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (2003); ARK. R.
EVID. 502; CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(b) (West
Supp. 2005); CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1 (privileges are defined by common law); Gould, Larson,
Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, P.C. v. Panico, 869 A.2d 653, 656 (Conn. 2005); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
502; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-21(2), -24, -25 (1995);
HAW. R. EvID. 503; IDAHO R. EVID. 502; Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, 727 N.E.2d
240, 243 (I11. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(1) (LexisNexis 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(West 1999); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-426 (West Supp. 2005); KY. R. EVID. 503; LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 506 (1995); ME. R. EvID. 502; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108
(LexisNexis 2002); Purcell v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 676 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Mass.
1997); MICH. R. EVID. 501 (privileges are defined by common law); McCartney v. Attorney Gen.,
587,N.W.2d 824, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(2) (West 2000)
(privilege in criminal cases); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(b) (West 2000); MISS. R. EVID. 502; MO.
ANN. STAT. § 491.060(3) (West Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (2005); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 27-503 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.035-.115 (LexisNexis 2002);
N.H. R. EVID. 502; N.J. R. EVID. 504; N.M. R. EVID. 11-503; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney Supp.
2006); N.C. R. EVID. 501 (privileges are defined by common law); In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 779
(N.C. 2003); N.D. R. EVID. 502; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(A) (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502 (West Supp. 2006); OR. R. EVID. 503; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5916,
5928 (West 2000); R.I. R. EVID. 501 (privileges are defined by common law); DeFusco v. Giorgio,
440 A.2d 727, 731 (R.I. 1982); S.C. R. EVID. 501 (privileges are defined by common law); Floyd v.
Floyd, 615 S.E.2d 465, 482-84 (S.C. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-2 to -5 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (1994); TEX. R. EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502; Sevachko
v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 898, 902 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(2)
(West Supp. 2006); see W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b); State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madden, 601 S.E.2d
25, 33-34 (W.Va. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i)
(2005).
173. See State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 415-16 n.10 (Minn. 2002) (holding that the judicial
branch has ultimate and final authority in evidentiary matters, despite the Minnesota legislature's
attempts to limit the court's power with regard to rules of privilege); People v. Diaz, 985 P.2d 83, 87
(Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that under the Colorado Constitution, "the supreme court had the
power to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure," including procedural rules of
evidence, but that a statute affecting the practice or procedure of the courts was not unconstitutional
unless it conflicted with a rule of court); Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309, 312 (W. Va. 1996)
(holding that the court possessed "paramount authority to adopt rules of evidence" for state courts);
City of Fargo v. Ruether, 490 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 1992) (holding that the court was
"constitutionally authorized to promulgate rules of procedure," including evidence, and unless there
was a conflict, statutory rules simply supplemented the court's rules); State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel,
691 P.2d 678, 681-82 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that the supreme court possessed procedural rulemaking
power, but it would recognize a reasonable, workable statutory rule that did not conflict with the
court's rules).
174. See Cramer v. Peavy, 3 P.3d 665, 670 (Nev. 2000); see also Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 704
(Tex. App. 2001) (holding that because the state constitution "specifically authorizes the legislature
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Evidence prescribe the common law rule of decision with regard to privilege
where it is not otherwise provided by applicable federal law,'75 which has
been interpreted as conferring the authority on the courts to determine
privileges on a case-by-case basis.
17 6
The basic parameters of the privilege in many jurisdictions follow the
instrumentalist formulation of the rule by John Henry Wigmore: where a
client seeks legal advice from a professional legal adviser in that capacity,
the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the
client, are at the client's instance permanently protected from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, unless the protection is waived.17  Under this
formulation, the problems in applying the privilege to law students arise
from the requirements that the communication: must be made to a
professional legal adviser, must be made in confidence, may not be waived
(i.e., by the presence of a law student), and the privilege must remain solely
the client's to assert.
Alternatively, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
formulates the elements of the privilege more generally and requires a
communication between privileged persons, in confidence, for the purpose
to write rules of evidence," an evidence statute "trumps" a court-adopted rule); Roberts v. City of
Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 501 (Cal. 1993).
175. FED. R. EVID. 501.
176. See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (holding that Congress has
manifested a desire "not to freeze the law of privilege," but rather to provide courts with the
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)); see also In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981). Congress has
plenary power "over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts," but this authority
has been delegated to the federal courts on the condition that court rules are consistent with federal
statutes. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976). Many federal courts are
reluctant to create new privileges and hold that existing federal privileges are to be strictly construed.
See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, some commentators
interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 as giving the federal courts the authority to innovate on a
case-by-case basis, as long as the interpretation of the common law proceeds "in light of reason and
experience." 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5425 (1980) [hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM]. Based on the legislative history of
the proposed and rejected federal rules of evidence and privilege, Congress may not have shared the
view that privileges should generally be curtailed and indeed intended that the courts should be more
receptive to novel claims of privilege than they had been in the past. Id.
177. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, p. 554 (John T.
MeNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE]. The instrumentalist approach has been
described as allowing a privilege to conceal information to a tribunal only if it leads to a desired end,
i.e., it is justified by furthering some other social policy. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 176, at §
5422, 5422.1. The non-instrumentalist arguments for a privilege do not focus on the effect of the
privilege and instead rest on moral grounds, i.e., it is morally wrong for courts to compel disclosure
of attorney-client confidences, because that would involve a compulsory betrayal that violates
loyalty, fairness, and justice contrary to notions of human dignity. See id. at § 5472. Professors
Wright and Graham argued that Congressional rejection of the Advisory Committee's judgment on
privileges indicated a rejection of the instrumentalist approach, and that in assessing novel claims of
privilege, courts should place less reliance on the Wigmore criteria and give greater emphasis to
humanistic values such as privacy and personal autonomy to justify the exclusion of evidence. Id.
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of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client. 7 8  The
corresponding elements at issue for law students in this formula are whether
a law student is a privileged person and whether a communication is made in
confidence if a law student apprentice is present during the communication.
The courts' interpretation and application of the other elements of the
attorney-client privilege in either formulation do not pose special concerns
for law students.
The courts construe privilege rules narrowly, following Wigmore's
views of decades ago:
There must be good reason, plainly shown, for [the privileges']
existence... The investigation of truth and the enforcement of
testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these
privileges. They should be recognized only within the narrowest
limits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to
provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the
administration of justice. 7 9
Thus, the issues relating to the attorney-client privilege that affect law
students in experiential learning situations with real clients are: (1) whether a
law student qualifies as a professional legal adviser or privileged person, (2)
whether the client intended the communication to be confidential given the
presence of a law student, or whether the student's presence waives the
privilege, and (3) whether the client-focused right to the privilege requires
non-essential law student apprentices to be excluded from client
conferences.
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
179. WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2192, at 73; see Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144
(2003) (holding that "statutes establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed narrowly
because privileges impede the search for the truth."). But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 176,
§ 5422 (discussing Congress' rejection of the strict construction views of the instrumentalists).
Although some federal courts have stressed that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow courts to create
new privileges, see, e.g., In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 429, the United States Supreme Court has said
that it is disinclined to exercise the authority granted by rule 501 expansively. See Univ. of Penn. v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. at 189.
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A. Communications to a Professional Legal Adviser or Privileged Person
1. Law Students Generally
A law student ordinarily does not qualify as a "professional legal
adviser" or enjoy the attorney-client privilege. 180 "[A] mere student at law,
aspiring to future entrance to the profession, is without the privilege,
however much legal skill he may possess in comparison with some of those
who are within it.'
' 8
'
Courts have used bar admission as a threshold for deciding whether an
individual qualifies as a professional legal adviser and is covered by the
privilege. 8  Where the legal adviser is presumed by the bar to be
unqualified to practice law, the policy underlying the privilege, promoting
the free flow of information between lawyer and client, does not apply. 83
"There is no ground for encouraging the relation of client and legal adviser
except when the adviser is one who has been formally admitted to the office
of attorney or counselor as duly qualified to give legal advice."' 8 4 One court
reasoned that giving the privilege to an unsupervised law student would blur
the dividing line between qualified and unqualified attorneys, and encourage
the public to entrust secrets to the unskilled, to the detriment of the legal
profession.'85 It would also undermine the power of the state to regulate the
profession, whose members play a vital role in the preservation of society. 86
Thus, even a law graduate, if not formally licensed, ordinarily does not
qualify as a professional legal adviser for purposes of the privilege.'87
180. See, e.g., People v. Doe, 416 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1979); State v. Lender, 124
N.W.2d 355, 359 (Minn. 1963); Dierstein v. Schubkagel, 18 A. 1059, 1060 (Pa. 1890).
181. WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2300, at 581 (citing Andrews v. Soloman, I Fed. Cas. 899, 901
(No. 378) (C.C. Pa. 1816); Barnes v. Hams, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 576 (1851); Dierstein, 18 A. at
1060; Holman v. Kimball, 1850 WL 3500 (Vt. 1850)).
182. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v.
Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994); Perkins v. Gregg County, 891 F. Supp. 361, 363
(E.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 41 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Dabney v. Inv.
Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1169 (D. S.C. 1974); see also State v. Van Landingham, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547 (N.C.
1973).
183. WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2300, at 580. The litmus test of bar admission supports the
arguments by critics of the privilege that it is chiefly intended to protect and benefit the legal
profession, which jealously guards against the unauthorized practice of law. See Fischel, supra note
161.
184. WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2300, at 580 (citing Sample v. Frost, 10 Iowa 266 (1859); State
v. Smith, 50 S.E. 859 (N.C. 1905); Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 456 (1854)). But see Benedict v. State,
11 N.E. 125, 129-30 (Ohio 1887) (holding that the privilege did apply to communications with
someone who had long practiced before justices of the peace, but who was not admitted to the bar).
185. Dabney, 82 F.R.D. at466.
186. Id. But see Fischel, supra note 161.
187. People v. Doe, 416 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1979); State v. Lender, 124 N.W.2d 355,
359 (Minn. 1963).
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Where state law recognizes a privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications between a lawyer and client, a "lawyer" means a person
duly authorized to practice law.
88
Few cases have considered the application of the attorney-client
privilege to law students or unlicensed law graduates in any depth. 8 9 In
State v. Lender, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply to a law graduate who was not yet formally
licensed. 190 While working for the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, the
law graduate had given legal advice to an 18-year-old unwed mother who
asked for assistance in suing to establish the paternity of her child.' 9'
Initially, the lower court looked to the essential nature of the consultation
and the relationship and found that the records in dispute were protected by
the attorney-client privilege.' 92 Although the law graduate was not admitted
to practice until a month after the consultation with the client, the trial court
found that the client consulted him in a "legal capacity," and held that the
privilege should apply.1
93
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and
refused to extend the privilege to unlicensed law graduates.' 94 The court
held that the evidence did not satisfy the required elements of the privilege,
because there was no evidence that the client had made confidential
disclosures to the law graduate "under a reasonable belief that he was
authorized to practice law and for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice ... ."'9' The court's underlying assumption seemed to be that an 18-
year-old unwed mother who visited the Legal Aid Society to seek assistance
in establishing the paternity of her child did not have a "reasonable" belief
that a law graduate she spoke with there was authorized to practice law.
196
"[E]ven though we might speculate that those were the facts, we are not
prepared to extend the scope of the attorney-client privilege to prevent
disclosure of communications made to a law graduate awaiting his formal
admission to practice."' 97 The court noted that some legal commentators
188. See, e.g., People v. Doe, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 469; Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1960); WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2300, at 581.
189. In most cases in which the subject arises, law students are simply included (often in dicta) in
a list of persons to whom the attorney-client privilege does not apply.
190. Id. at 359.
191. Id. at 357.
192. Id.
193. State v. Lender, 124 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. 1963).
194. Id. at 359.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Lender, 124 N.W.2d at 359.
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had supported the extension of the privilege to someone not admitted to
practice, but it found no reported cases to that effect and held that "it would
seem unreasonable to grant the privilege to a person who makes no inquiry
concerning whether he is consulting with a lawyer or a layman.'
98
In People v. Doe, 99 the court faced a similar situation and also held that
the attorney-client privilege did not apply to a law school graduate not yet
admitted to the bar.20 0 Because the state rule granted the privilege only to
"an attorney," the court held that graduation from law school alone would
not bring someone within the scope of the privilege rule. 20' To be an
attorney, the individual "must be licensed by the state to practice law.,
20 2
Most of the other cases that specifically excluded law students from the
privilege simply held, with little explanation, that confidential
communications to a law student as a legal adviser were not privileged.0 3
Despite the privilege's traditionally strict construction and the accepted
maxim that the privilege applies only to "professional legal advisers" who
are licensed attorneys, courts in more recent years have broadened its
coverage to include some non-attorneys. For example, since the advent of
student practice rules, the scope of the attorney-client privilege must include
law students specially certified under those rules.2°
2. Certified Law Students
Although the attorney-client privilege ordinarily applies only to licensed
attorneys, i.e. those authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction, all states
have now passed student practice rules that allow certified law students to
perform the functions of attorneys in certain circumstances. 20 5 Because
198. Id.
199. 416 N.Y.S.2d 466.
200. Id. at 469.
201. Id. (quoting Dierstein v. Schubkagel, 18 A. 1059, 1060 (Pa. 1890)).
202. Id. (quoting Kent Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12, 18 (1952)).
203. See, e.g., Dierstein, 18 A. at 1060; Barnes v. Harris, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 576, 578 (1851).
204. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
205. ALA. ST. LEGAL INTERNSHIP R. I-IV; ALASKA BAR PART IV, R. 44; ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(d);
ARK. BAR ADMISSION R. XV; CAL. CT. R. 983.2; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-5-116.1 TO -116.4
(West 2003); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 3-17; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 56; D.C. CT. APP. R. 48 (2004); FLA.
BAR R. 11-1.1 TO -1.9 (2005); GA. SUP. CT. R. 91 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-18-22 (d), 15-20-8
(2005); HAW. SuP. CT. R. 7(7.1)-(7.7); IDAHO BAR COMM'N R. 221(a)-(t); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 711 (a)-
(f); IND. ATTORNEY ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINE R. 2.1; IOWA CT. R. 31.15; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 709;
KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.540; LA. SUP. CT. R. XX; ME. R. Civ. P. 90; ME. R. CRIM. P. 56; MD. R.
GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR R. 16; MASS. SUP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:03; MICH. CT. R. 8.120;
MINN. STUDENT PRACTICE R. 1-2; MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-201 to 211 (2005); Mo. SUP. CT. R.
13.01-13.06; ORDER IN RE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MONT. STUDENT PRACTICE R. (1975); NEB. R. OF
LEGAL PRACTICE BY APPROVED SENIOR LAW STUDENTS (2000); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 49.5; N.H. Sup.
CT. R. 36; N.J. CT. R. 1:21-3; N.M. CT. R. 1-094.1; N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 478, 484 (McKinney 2005);
N.C. BAR R. §§ .0200-.04, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1C.0204 (2001); N.D. R. ON LIMITED
PRACTICE OF LAW BY LAW STUDENTS § 11 (2005); OHIO SUP. CT. R. FOR THE GOV'T OF THE BAR R.
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some law students are authorized to practice law under these rules, the scope
of the attorney-client privilege necessarily has been expanded to encompass
those law students.
Student practice rules were enacted primarily to encourage clinical
programs and further the goals of legal education. Other goals included
serving indigent clients and assisting state and governmental agency
lawyers.2 °6  Many practice rules are based on the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Rule, adopted in 1969 to encourage
clinical programs in law schools and to provide legal services to indigent
persons. °7
The emphasis in most states' rules is on promoting legal education. For
example, California's rule is intended to provide a program of practical
training for law students as a "valuable complement to academic classes. 20 8
Mississippi's rule acknowledges the public interest in encouraging effective
legal internship and clinical legal education programs as a form of legal
education.20 9 Utah's rule is intended "[t]o ensure the provision of competent
legal services [and to] increase the opportunity of law students to have first-
hand contact with the legal system and participate directly in the court
process,21° Courts across the country have recognized the need for "hands-
ii; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 6, r. 1.1-11 (West 2005)); OR. CT. R. 13.05-.30; PA. BAR
ADMISSION R. 321-22; R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. II, r. 9(c); S.C. APP. CT. R. 401; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
16-18-2.1 to 2.10 (1995); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 7 § 10.03; TEX. R. & REGS. GOVERNING THE
PARTICIPATION OF QUALIFIED LAW STUDENTS & QUALIFIED UNLICENSED LAW SCHOOL
GRADUATES IN THE TRIAL OF CASES IN TEXAS R. IV-V (2003); UTAH CT. R. 11-30; VT. SUP. CT. R.
OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR § 13 (2005); VA. SUP. CT. R. part 6 § 4, 15; WASH. ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE R. 9; W. VA. R. FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 10.0-.5 (2005); WiS. SUP. CT.
R. §§ 50.01-.085; WYO. SUP. CT. R. PROVIDING FOR THE ORG. & GOV'T OF THE BAR ASS'N 12. The
American Bar Association promulgated a Model Student Practice Rule in 1969; the United States
Judicial Conference adopted a model student practice rule in 1979. See John E. Exton et al.,
Submission of the Association of American Law Schools to the Supreme Court of the State of
Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court's Student Practice Rule, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 539, 549 (1998) [hereinafter EXTON]. Although the focus of this section is on state law student
practice rules, many federal courts have adopted student practice rules as well. For example, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
local rules governing appearance and argument by eligible law students, as do the federal district
courts in approximately forty states.
206. See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for This
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 12-16 (2000) (discussing the social justice
dimension of clinical education and noting that law school clinics play an important part in making
access to justice a reality for low-income people).
207. ABA MODEL STUDENT PRACTICE RULE (1969), reprinted in STUDENT PRACTICE AS A
METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 71, at 476-79.
208. CAL. R. & REGS. GOVERNING THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS 1.0 (1997).
209. MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-3-203.
210. UTAHCT. R. 11-301.
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on" legal training,211 and without a student practice rule, experiential clinical
programs could not exist, given the prohibitions against the unauthorized
practice of law.212
Student practice rules allow qualified law students to perform some of
the functions of an attorney in the specific situations defined by the rules.
There is wide variation among states about which law students are eligible
for certification and what they may do. Depending on the state, the
eligibility of law students may be restricted by year of study or hours of law
school credit completed, by the type of clients they may serve, by the types
of cases they may handle, by the courts in which they may appear, and by
the types of legal tasks they may perform.213 Some states prefer, or restrict
student practice to, students enrolled in a law school clinical program.21 4 All
states require that students have completed their first year of law studies;
many restrict student practice to even more senior students.1 5 Some states
allow law students to serve only indigent clients or the state.2t 6 Students
may appear in court under most student practice rules, but some limit court
appearances to lower courts or less serious cases, and most states require a
supervising attorney to be present in the courtroom when the student appears
on behalf of a client.2 7 Thus, certified law students have been accorded the
status of "professional legal advisers" in some circumstances under the law
student practice rules.21 8
211. EXTON, supra note 205, at 548.
212. Id.
213. See STUDENT PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 71, at 465-76.
Although one would expect that the educational value of student practice experience would vary
significantly depending on the scope of the state's student practice rule, one survey of students,
supervisors, and legal educators did not find such a correlation. Id. at 376. However, the same
survey did find a consensus that student practice experience of some kind had a strong positive
impact on a law student's education. Id. at 374. To the extent that state rules restrict student
practice to narrow groups of students (e.g., only those enrolled in law school clinical programs) and
eliminate the potential for all students to participate in other law school sponsored mentoring or
apprentice programs that involve outside attorneys and live clients, the scope of student practice
rules may well have a detrimental impact on legal education.
214. See, e.g., D.C. CT. APP. R. 48; MD. R. GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR 16; MISS. CODE
ANN. § 73-3-205; N.M. CT. R. 1-094,1-094.1.
215. See, e.g., GA. SUP. CT. R. 91; N.J. CT. R. 1:21-3; OR. CT. R. 13.20; UTAH CT. R. 11-301.
216. See, e.g., FLA. BARR. 11-1.2; MICH. CT. R. 8.120.
217. See, e.g., UTAH CT. R. 11-301; GA. SUP. CT. R.91.
218. This holds true even as against some clients' rights. For example, courts have acknowledged
the legitimacy of certified students in the courtroom by holding that the mere fact that a criminal
defendant was represented by a certified law student rather than a licensed attorney did not deny the
defendant the constitutional right to assistance of counsel, as long as the law student provided
reasonably competent representation under the immediate supervision of an experienced attorney.
See, e.g., People v. Perez, 594 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1979); People v. Masonis, 228 N.W.2d 489, 491
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975). Courts have recognized that a rigid adherence to the requirements of
licensing for students who in limited circumstances function as attorneys "would undermine the
programs undertaken by the bar and the law schools to ensure that newly admitted lawyers are
competent to undertake the independent responsibility" of representing clients. Perez, 594 P.2d at 5;
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Although all states now have a law student practice rule, only four states
explicitly provide in their rules or rule commentary that certified students are
covered by the attorney-client privilege: Arizona, Ohio, Washington, and
Massachusetts.2 1 9 Arizona's rule states, "[t]he rules of law and of evidence
relating to privileged communications between attorney and client shall
govern communications made or received by professors or students certified
under the provisions of this rule., 220  Ohio's rule states, "[t]he
communications of the client to the legal intern shall be privileged under the
same rules that govern the attorney-client privilege.2 21 Washington's rule
provides, "[fjor purposes of the attorney-client privilege, an intern shall be
considered a subordinate of the lawyer providing supervision for the
intern. '222 Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its order
implementing the student practice rule, provided: "The rules of law and of
evidence relating to privileged communications between attorney and client
shall govern communications made or received by any student acting under
the provisions of [the student practice rule]."223
Despite the absence of explicit provisions extending the attorney-client
privilege to certified law students in other states, such an extension of the
privilege must be implied. It is unthinkable that the student practice rules of
a jurisdiction could sanction a law student's representation of live clients,
including interviewing and counseling them, without expecting students to
observe client confidentiality and in turn, according the protection of the
attorney-client privilege to their clients. In the reported cases involving the
appearance of or representation by certified law students, no challenge to the
attorney-client privilege has arisen, and courts have not questioned this
aspect of their status as legal advisers. 4
see also In re Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). However, some courts
have insisted that the requirements of the student practice rules be strictly followed. See, e.g.,
Adams v. State, 693 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a violation of defendant's right to
counsel where he was represented by an unsupervised law student who was totally unfamiliar with
the case); Cheatham v. State, 364 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (granting relief where the
student practice rule requiring the client's consent was not met, and the law student lawyer was not
properly supervised).
219. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(h)(4) (2005); OHIO SuP. CT. R. FOR THE Gov'T OF THE BAR I(5)(e)
(2000); WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICER. 9(d)(6); MASS. SUP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:03 (2005).
220. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(h)(4).
221. OHIO SuP. CT. R. FOR THE GOV'T OF THE BAR II(5)(e).
222. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 9(d)(6).
223. Order Implementing MASS. SUP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:03, § 3.
224. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 594 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979); People v. Masonis, 228 N.W.2d 489
(Mich. App. 1975); In re Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Dwyer,
512 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
Extending the attorney-client privilege to certified law students is
consistent with the provisions in many states' rules requiring certified
students to abide by the rules of professional conduct for licensed attorneys,
including the duty of confidentiality.225 Requiring students to adhere to
professional conduct rules adds to the authenticity of their experiential
learning. Some states enforce these rules by threatening to prevent a law
student who has violated professional conduct rules from sitting for the bar
examination or from being licensed.226 Other states' rules simply enjoin
certified students, without further elaboration, from disclosing privileged or
confidential communications.2 27
Additional safeguards of the client's right to confidentiality from student
legal advisers derive from the professional responsibility of the supervising
attorney. Many student practice rules specifically impose upon the
supervising attorney a duty to supervise both the law student's conduct and
work product to comply with all professional obligations to the client.228 For
example, Ohio's rule addresses this professional responsibility:
The supervising attorney shall provide the legal intern with the
opportunity to engage in and observe the practice of law, shall
discuss and counsel the intern regarding matters of professional
responsibility that arise, and shall train and supervise the legal
intern on matters assigned to the intern to the extent necessary to
properly protect the interests of the client and to properly advance
and promote the intern's training.229
Safeguarding client confidentiality to protect the client's interests would
make little sense without a corresponding extension of the attorney-client
privilege to certified students.
In summary, the state student practice rules were adopted to encourage
and support experiential learning and law school clinical programs, and to
some extent, student practice has filled some of the educational gaps in the
traditional case method system of training lawyers.2 3 0 However, the scope of
student practice rules is limited in all jurisdictions to only specific categories
225. See, e.g., RULES GOVERNING THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS, 1997 State Bar
of Cal. 4.2.1.3; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-116.2 (f); WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R.
9(a)(5).
226. See, e.g., WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 9 (c).
227. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(h)(4).
228. See, e.g., IDAHO BAR COMM'N R. 221(i)(1) (stating that the supervising attorney "shall be
fully responsible for the acts and conduct of the legal intern while acting within the scope of
authority and work assigned... by the supervising attorney"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18-2.9
(1995) (stating that a supervising lawyer "shall assume personal professional responsibility for the
conduct of the legal intern").
229. OHIO SuP. CT. R. FOR THE GOV'T OF THE BAR I, § 7(B).
230. See STUDENT PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 71, at 375; see
also supra discussion Part 111.
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of eligible law students in sometimes narrowly defined circumstances. 31
Even the most liberal state practice rule does not apply to first-year law
students, who need exposure to attorney-mentors and experiential learning
opportunities for the same reasons upper-level students benefit from such
contact.23 2  Thus, the express or implied extension of the attorney-client
privilege that has evolved from state student practice rules is inadequate to
serve the greater needs of legal education.
B. Communications Made in Confidence and Not Waived
The second requirement of the privilege with implications for law
students is that clients must intend communications with their lawyers to be
confidential. Most privilege rules define a communication as confidential
only if the client does not intend it to be disclosed to any third persons other
than those supporting the rendition of professional legal services to the client
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.2 33
If unnecessary third parties are present, courts will presume that the client
did not intend secrecy, and without confidential intent, the client waives the
attorney-client privilege.234
231. See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1517 (1998). The limited nature of the student practice rules in
some states may also have been connected to initial concerns that certified law students might take
legal work away from practicing lawyers. Although the emphasis in state student practice rules is on
furthering legal education, the initial impetus of the A.B.A. Model Student Practice Rule seems to
have been access to legal services for the poor. See id. at 1515-16 n.28. A broadly worded student
practice rule might have allowed students to further their education by also representing clients who
otherwise would have to pay an attorney. Without a student practice rule, students would be
deterred from assisting legal clients for fear of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. See id.
Thus, the limits in many practice rules on service to poor clients or to the government not only
served goals of altruism and public service, but may have allayed concerns of practicing lawyers
about competition from certified students.
232. See CAL. R. & REGS. GOVERNING THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS; CAL. CT. R.
983.2.
233. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 502; ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARK. R. EVID. 502; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.
502; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502; HAW. R. EVID. 503; IDAHO R. EVID. 502; Ky. R. EVID. 503; LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506; ME. R. EVID. 502; MiSS. R. EVID. 502; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503;
N.H. R. EVID. 502; N.M. R. EVID. 11-503; N.D. R. EVID. 502; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502; OR.
R. EVID. 503; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-2 to -5; TEX. R. EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R.
EVID. 502; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 70, 71 (2000).
234. See Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. 2001). But see Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d
263, 266 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the mere presence of a third party does not waive the privilege; it
is the client's intent that controls).
The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to show that the
communication was confidential and not waived.235 Although the client
need not request secrecy expressly, the courts will not infer the required
intent simply from the fact that the communication was between a lawyer
and client.236 Instead, the court will look at the circumstances surrounding
the communication to decide whether the client intended secrecy.237  If the
client intends the communication to be confidential, presumably he would
take precautions to ensure that no third persons could overhear the
conversation.2 38 This includes anyone not necessary to the communication,
because it indicates intent that the communication not be confidential. For
example, courts have held that the presence of a client's son during
communications with an attorney waived the privilege. 23 9 "Communications
made by a client to an attorney in the presence of a third person, are
regarded as made to such third person, and are not protected., 240 Any third
person who overhears an otherwise privileged communication may testify
about it.
241
The exceptions to the third-party waiver rule include only those persons
necessary to support the attorney's representation of the client or those
necessary to transmit the communication, because the presence of these
parties does not negate confidential intent. At common law, an agent,
235. See, e.g., In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Mass.
1997); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d
995, 1004-05 (R.I. 1984); United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978). But see In re
Investigating Grand Jury, 593 A.2d 402, 406 (Pa. 1991) (holding that under Pennsylvania law, the
burden of showing waiver is on the party asserting waiver).
236. See von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1005.
237. See, e.g., Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Tenn. 1984); Hutton
v. Hutton, 337 P.2d 635, 639 (Kan. 1959).
238. See In re Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab., 681 N.E.2d at 841. The inference that the
client did not intend secrecy is questionable when applied to law students present during confidential
communications with an attorney. Ordinarily clients would assume that a law student present with
the attorney is either a clerk or an employee and would not question the law student's presence.
Clients may also assume that law students are subject to the same confidentiality requirements as
lawyers. Additionally, a client who is unfamiliar with the methods of legal education reasonably
may believe that just as medical students observe patient care at the side of licensed physicians, law
students routinely apprentice with experienced attorneys to learn to practice. Thus, a law student's
presence in a law office would seem quite ordinary and proper and should not negate the client's
confidential intent.
239. Although older cases extended the third-party waiver rule to cover even family members,
see, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 295 P.2d 131, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that the attorney's
conversation with the client in the presence of the client's son was not privileged), some more recent
decisions hold that the presence of family members does not necessarily negate confidential intent.
See, e.g., State v. Sucharew, 66 P.3d 59, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the presence of a
witness' father during a consultation with his attorney did not negate confidential intent); Kevlik v.
Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1984). But see State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Minn.
2001) (holding that the presence of the client's wife waived the privilege, because she was a non-
client third party).
240. Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172 (1859), available at 1859 WL 1260.
241. See Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859), available at 1859 WL 7383.
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intermediary, or interpreter for an attorney who facilitated communications
between the attorney and client stood "upon the same footing" as the
attorney and was not allowed to divulge any confidential fact learned while
acting as the conduit of information between the attorney and client.242
Courts have recognized that an attorney's effectiveness often depends upon
the assistance of secretaries, office administrators, messengers, clerks not yet
admitted to the bar, and other kinds of aides. 243 If the support of agents or
employees is essential to the attorney's work, or the attorney or client
requires assistance in communicating, then the privilege includes those
agents.2 4
The codified attorney-client privilege rules in twenty-three states
expressly extend the privilege to a "representative" of the attorney. 245 A
representative typically is defined as one "employed" to assist the lawyer in
the rendition of professional legal services. 246 Three states' rules extend the
privilege specifically to "employees" of the attorney instead.2 47  A
representative or employee presumably includes clerks, stenographers,
248paralegals, investigators, and interpreters, but a few states' rules identify
more specifically to which of the attorney's support staff the privilege
applies. For example, Iowa's rule includes only a stenographer or
confidential clerk in the privilege in addition to the attorney,2 4 9 and
Colorado's rule names secretaries, paralegals, legal assistants, stenographers,
and clerks.25 ° Privilege rules that cover a representative or employee of the
242. See, e.g., Hawes v. State, 7 So. 302, 313 (Ala. 1890). Rules of professional responsibility
now require reasonable efforts by an attorney to ensure that the conduct of non-lawyers employed by
or associated with the attorney is compatible with the professional obligations of the attorney. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2003); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1980).
243. See von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 1987).
244. WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2301; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 70.
245. See ALA. R. EVID. 502; ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARK. R. EVID. 502; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 502;
HAW. R. EVID. 503; IDAHO R. EVID. 502; KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-426; KY. R. EVID. 503;
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506; ME. R. EVID. 502; MISS. R. EVID. 502; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-
503; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.095; N.H. R. EVID. 502; N.M. R. EVID. 11-503; N.D. R. EVID. 502;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502; OR. R. EVID. 503; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-2 to -5; TEX. R.
EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03.
246. See generally supra note 245. Although "employed by the attorney" arguably could mean
"used by the attorney," the more common meaning suggests a paid employee.
247. See KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-426; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
4503.
248. See, e.g., People v. Doe, 416 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1979); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 176, at § 5482.
249. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1999).
250. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(l)(b).
attorney would include law students working for an attorney during a paid
clerkship.
The language of the privilege rules does not appear to cover law
students in unpaid volunteer positions or in law school sponsored extem or
mentorship programs. Nor does the privilege allow for the presence of law
students during client meetings for purely educational purposes. Early cases
held that the privilege did not extend to a student at law just because the
student was studying in an attorney's office or under the attorney's
direction .2 1 The privilege attached to the law student only if he was acting
as agent or clerk for the lawyer in the particular transaction with the client;
"[b]eyond that the privilege does not extend. 2 52 Thus, a privilege rule
covering only representatives or employees does not cover students
interested in unpaid public interest legal work, students in externships who
receive credit rather than money as they learn to practice, or students
observing an experienced attorney-mentor who is not an employer.
Paradoxically, it is those unpaid law students most interested in the learning
experience that exposure to law practice and attorney-mentors can provide
who must be kept away from real clients, for fear that their presence might
jeopardize the attorney-client privilege.
Many of the codified privilege rules that extend the privilege to
representatives or employees of the attorney restrict those categories further
by covering only those persons who are "necessary" to enable the attorney
and client to communicate with each other. 3 This is consistent with the
common law rule. Even if a law student were included in a privilege rule
covering the attorney's employees or representatives, the presence of the law
student additionally must be "reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication" or "in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services. 254 Such a restriction excludes law students who simply wish to
learn professional skills and values by observing the interaction between an
attorney-mentor and the client, however educational that experience could
be. To avoid a loss of the privilege because of the law student's presence,
the attorney would have to contrive some task for the student to accomplish
that would arguably be necessary for the representation of the client. More
251. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 176 (1885), available at 1885 WL 6893; see
also Holman v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 555 (1850) at 1850 WL 3500; Barnes v. Harris, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
576, 576 (1851); Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172 (1859), available at 1859 WL 1260.
252. Wartell v. Novograd, 137 A. 776, 778 (R.I. 1927).
253. See ALA. R. EVID. 502; ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARK. R. EVID. 502; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 502;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502; HAW. R. EvID. 503; IDAHO R. EVID. 502; KY. R. EVID. 503; LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 506; ME. R. EVID. 502; MISS. R. EvID. 502; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503; N.H. R.
EVID. 502; N.M. R. EVID. 11-503; N.D. R. EVID. 502; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502; OR. R. EVID.
503; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2 to -5; TEx. R. EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502;
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§
70, 71 (2000); Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859), available at 1859 WL 7383.
254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 70,71.
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likely, however, the uncertainty in the law on this subject deters cautious
attorneys from risking their clients' rights by allowing the presence of law
students during client conferences.
Under the current attorney-client privilege rules, a limited number of
students are allowed the opportunity for meaningful experiential learning
with clients, but many others are not. Law students are not covered by the
privilege if they are not "necessary" to the representation of the client or if
they merely observe a lawyer's work with clients as part of a law school
mentorship program. No matter how important experiential learning may be
to the professional and ethical development of law students, the law draws
no distinction between students and other third persons with regard to the
attorney-client privilege. The law student is considered no different from an
eavesdropper and may be required to testify about client communications
that otherwise would be confidential, were it not for the law student's
presence.
C. Communications Protected at the Client's Instance
In current attorney-client privilege jurisprudence, the privilege is client-
focused and client-controlled. The privilege belongs to the client, not to the
attorney.2  The underlying reasoning posits that clients will be encouraged
to make a full disclosure of their secrets to counsel only if they alone can
control the secrets that they share with their attorneys.256
This was not always so. At early English common law, the privilege
belonged to the attorney and was based, at least in part, on consideration for
"the oath and the honor of the attorney," rather than on the benefit of the
client.257 The first duty of the attorney was to keep his clients' secrets, and
the exemption from testifying protected this "point of honor" for the attorney
and the profession.258 However, there is also some indication in the early
reports that the privilege contributed to the proper functioning of the
255. See, e.g., Floyd v. Floyd, 615 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 2005); United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d
1543, 1551 (11 th Cir. 1990); WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2321.
256. In re Sean H., 586 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that "[tihe privilege is
therefore reserved for those whose interests it is designed to protect and not adverse parties or the
general population."). This contradicts the general policy emphasis that the privilege exists chiefly
to protect the proper working of the legal system and not to protect the privacy of individual clients.
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
257. See, e.g., Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 634; Regina v. Derby Magistrates' Court,
[1996] 1 A.C. 487 (H.L.); see also WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2290, at 543. One commentator has
criticized this "status-based justification for special treatment," which was apparently to spare the
attorney from the "unseemly" task of having to testify in court. Fischel, supra note 161, at 3.
258. See WIGMORE, supra note 177, §2290, at 543; Hazard, supra note 159, at 1070.
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adversarial system: among the different types of lawyers in English courts,
the privilege was granted to barristers (who had the exclusive right to
present evidence and argue the law in court) more often than to solicitors
(who advised clients and only prepared cases for the barrister's presentation
in court).15 9 The privilege protected barristers especially, because deposing
a lawyer with such a direct connection to litigation would disrupt the court
proceedings. Additionally, barristers were considered not just to be officers
of the court, but also members of it, and as such could not be required to
reveal a client's confidences, just as "a modem judge could not be [required]
to disclose matters heard in camera., 260 Initially then, the privilege belonged
to the attorney.261 Because the privilege protected the attorney's honor, the
attorney could waive the privilege.262 This justification for the privilege
eventually fell out of favor, but the privilege itself endured, because a new
justification-protecting the client's confidence in his legal adviser-was
developed to replace the older one. 63
It is now fairly settled that the client is the holder of the privilege, and
the client may prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made to facilitate the rendition of professional services
between the client and lawyer.26 4 The client is not the only one who can
assert the privilege, but the client is the only person who has the authority to
waive it. The attorney may assert it on the client's behalf 2 65 However, an
attorney alone cannot assert a client's privilege when the client agrees to
waive it,266 and an attorney cannot voluntarily waive a client's privilege
when the client wants to preserve it.2 67 The holder of the privilege, the
client, is the only one who can waive it voluntarily, as least with regard to
testifying about confidential information.268 If clients choose to waive the
benefits to which they are entitled, no one else has standing to complain.269
A corollary to this principle is that an attorney may not waive the
client's privilege by testifying against the client's wishes. The privilege
259. See Hazard, supra note 159, at 1070-7 1.
260. Id. at 1071. Cf WIciMORE, supra note 177, § 2290.
261. See Hazard, supra note 159, at 1071.
262. See WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2290(3).
263. See WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 2290; Hazard, supra note 159, at 1070 n.39.
264. See, e.g., State v. Charlesworth, 951 P.2d 153, 164 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
265. See, e.g., State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Iowa 1976); State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley,
22 P.3d 124, 141 (Kan. 2001). See also State v. Lender, 124 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Minn. 1963)
(refusing to recognize the privilege, in part because it was not the client, the holder of the privilege,
who had claimed the attorney-client privilege, nor apparently had it been asserted on her behalf).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990); Ex parte
Lipscomb, 239 S.W. 1101, 1103 (Tex. 1922).
267. See CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 73.1 (1999).
268. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 176, § 5487.
269. Note, Persons Entitled to Waive or Claim Privileges as to the Admission of Testimony, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 686, 686 (1930).
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prohibits the disclosure of the subject matter, and the policy of the privilege
is to protect the holder's legal interests from being prejudiced by the
disclosure. 270  Because the prohibition against waiver by the attorney
presumably extends not just to testifying, but also to other acts that may
trigger a waiver of the privilege, the attorney has no authority to disclose
confidential communications to third persons without the client's
permission. The attorney thus has an obligation imposed by the privilege
rules, in addition to the professional duty to maintain confidentiality, to
exclude law students from confidential client communications to avoid any
danger of waiving the client's rights. If the client were to consent to the
disclosure of allegedly confidential information to an outsider, for example
by allowing the presence of a law student observer during communications
with the attorney, the client as the holder of the privilege would lose it, for
lack of confidential intent.
It is in the interest of clients, individually and collectively, and of the
proper working of the legal system-the underlying justification for the
privilege to exist at all-to have skilled and ethical lawyers. However, the
narrow client-centered focus in defining the parameters of the privilege,
without regard to its effect on experiential legal education, impedes
fundamental systemic goals.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN DEVELOPING SKILLED AND ETHICAL LAWYERS
The law of privilege was not meant to remain frozen in time.2 71 Courts
have periodically reshaped privilege rules when necessary and appropriate,
even though they remain conservative in defining the parameters of the
privilege overall. The longer evolution of the privilege recognizes that there
are consequences more detrimental to the interests of society than the
rejection of evidence that might be disclosed. 72 Privileges exist because
certain interests and values are more important than the discovery of
information,2 73 and the attorney-client privilege exists to serve the
administration of justice, not any particular client.274
270. Id. at 692.
271. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); see FED. R. EVID. 501.
272. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 534 U.S. 399, 408 (1998); State v. Holsinger,
601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz. 1979) (holding that a criminal defendant does not "waive the...
privilege when she takes the stand to testify on her own behalf"); People v. Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d 559,
562 (N.Y. 1955).
273. See, e.g., Swidler, 524 U.S. at 408; In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426,429 (5th Cir. 1981).
274. See, e.g., Holsinger, 601 P.2d at 1058; Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d at 562.
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The current scope of the attorney-client privilege rules deprives a
significant number of law students of the opportunity for expeliential
learning with real clients, even though the attorney-client relationship is the
central focus of professional ability and ethical decision making.
Encouraging students to observe and participate in the work of experienced
attorneys with live clients can address a critical shortcoming in current legal
education. However, as discussed above, the attorney-client privilege does
not apply to law students as such, and student practice rules have not solved
the problem of educational access to experiential learning with real clients.
Student practice rules encompass only limited student practice in defined
situations and do not broadly encompass other options for experiential
learning with actual clients. Thus, students who are not fortunate enough to
participate in clinical law courses or who otherwise do not fall within the
coverage of student practice rules must be excluded from confidential client
communications to preserve the attorney-client privilege.
Many states extend the privilege to employees of the attorney, but this
exception protects only those law student employees who are "necessary" to
the representation. Even paid student law clerks are excluded from the
coverage of the privilege if they are not necessary to the attorney's work
with that particular client. Non-employee student externs who work for
course credit, students enrolled in unpaid mentor programs, and volunteer
law student clerks all may jeopardize the client's right to secrecy if they are
present at any meeting involving confidential communications to the
attorney. Thus, except in limited situations, law students must be excluded
from the experiences that could be most valuable for their professional
preparation.
Law schools are struggling to provide cost-efficient opportunities for
students to learn skills in an authentic setting with real clients. Yet
partnerships with the practicing bar-through volunteer clerkships or
attorney mentoring programs-must be limited by concerns about the
attorney-client privilege. Attorneys cannot risk their clients' rights under the
law, even in the course of fulfilling their own professional obligation to help
educate future attorneys.
The legal profession has a duty to promote high standards of
performance. Legal education builds the foundation, but law schools alone
cannot carry the full responsibility for educating lawyers. The practicing bar
plays an important role as well. Licensed attorneys, who enjoy the privilege
of practicing law and representing clients to the exclusion of others, share
the obligation to ensure that those entering the profession are not only
competent, but also properly socialized into the profession by learning its
shared ethical values. Collaborations between law schools and the
practicing bar could fill an urgent need to ensure basic competence in
lawyering skills before a student graduates from law school. However, the
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attorney-client privilege rules restrict the kind of mentoring programs and
externships that could supplement classroom learning and clinical programs
in a cost-effective way.
Policy concerns ordinarily at issue about expanding the privilege do not
apply to the question of whether the privilege should protect law students.
The law student privilege proposed here is derivative of that of the
supervising lawyer-it would not affect the scope of the privilege for
licensed attorneys. No information that was not protected before will
suddenly become secret if law students, supervised by licensed attorneys, are
allowed the protection of the privilege. No expectations of discovery will be
thwarted because of this modest extension of the privilege. Some law
students enjoy the privilege already, for sound pedagogical and public policy
reasons, and extending that protection to all law students will work no unfair
surprise on the parties to a law suit. It will simply make an important
opportunity for professional and ethical development equally available to all
law students.
The need for additional experiential learning and mentoring during law
school is more important than ever before, because opportunities for hands
on learning in an authentic setting are severely limited in law schools,
meaningful mentoring by senior attorneys in the early years of practice is
declining, and the loss of mentoring is having a damaging effect on the
professional skills and ethics of new lawyers. Rulemaking bodies in all
jurisdictions should amend their law student practice or attorney-client
privilege rules to allow the presence of law students, under the supervision
of a licensed attorney, during confidential client communications.
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